Background: Cream-skimming in the health care sector is a phenomenon that has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Cream-skimming can be defined as the selective treatment of patients that demand little resources while providing high economic refunds. It has been widely assumed that the activity-based financing (ABF) system introduced in Norway in 1997 together with the 2002 hospital reform would increase the incentives for cream-skimming, but so far little empirical evidence exists to support such a proposition. Method: The ABF system offers the same economic reimbursement for patients classified within day-surgical DRGs irrespective of whether the patient actually receives same-day treatment or inpatient care over several days, and the potential for cream-skimming is consequently high within these diagnoses. Using patient data from the 1999-2004-period, the analysis investigates the relationship between patient severity -indicated by length of stay -and waiting time within the largest day-surgical DRGs, controlling for age and gender of the patient, treatment in private hospital, as well as institutional and dynamic variation. The model is estimated by regression analysis. Results: The analysis gives some evidence of patient selection, although the picture is far from clear-cut: out of 24 procedures analysed, waiting time increased with patient severity in 11 cases, and decreased in 7. There are however strong variations with regards to the practical effects of patient severity. Conclusion: Whereas our paper focuses solely on economic motivation as an explanation for patient selection, this is probably only part of the picture. Our results should therefore be interpreted with some caution. Only by taking into account important aspects related to hospital capacity and organisation, and the use of personnel and equipment, can we obtain a satisfactorily understanding of how patients are selected for day-surgical treatment.
Introduction
Cream-skimming in the health care sector is a phenomenon that has attracted considerable attention in recent years. In short, cream-skimming can be defined as the selective treatment of patients that demand little resources while providing high economic refunds. Cream-skimming may take on different forms, such as hospitals choosing healthier patients from their waiting lists, patients being re-classified to maximise income, or patients being selected for treatment on different set of criteria (Culyer, 1993) . This kind of behaviour is usually assumed to prove a more significant problem in market-oriented health systems (Le Grand, 1991) . Given that recent health reforms in many Western countries have introduced market-based hospital financing schemes (e.g. Newhouse, 1994) , there is consequently a growing interest in exploring the potential for protection against cream-skimming, while at the same time preserving incentives to efficiency.
Adapting to the increasing market-orientation in Western welfare systems, Norway introduced an activity based financing (ABF) scheme for the hospitals in 1997. A second major reform was introduced in 2002 as the central government took over responsibility and ownership of all public hospitals from the counties, and turned them into trusts (see e.g. Hagen and Kaarbøe, forthcoming) . So far few empirical studies have addressed the problem of cream-skimming. The study of creamskimming is mainly rooted in the economic literature, and builds on a theoretical rather than an empirical approach, with the main ambition being the development of financing systems that reduces the scope for such behaviour (e.g. Matsaganis & Glennerster, 1993; Jones & Cullis, 1996; Ellis, 1999; Barros, 2003) . The approach of the present paper is somewhat different, as our ambition is to explore the actual patient prioritisation of Norwegian hospitals in the wake of the new financing system and the 2002 hospital reform.
We concentrate on day surgery. Day surgery has gained increasing significance in Norway, as elsewhere in industrialised countries, during the last decade. Norwegian public health policy objectives explicitly state an aim to move towards outpatient and same-day surgical services 1 , and this mode of treatment now constitutes more than 60
per cent of all elective surgery. The main arguments for substituting inpatient care with day surgery are well known: it is assumed to be less traumatising for the patient, involves lighter narcosis than in the case of traditional surgery, and implies shorter treatment time and faster convalescence. The underlying assumption is therefore that this mode of delivering surgery will ultimately increase the efficiency of hospitals as well as the quality of the patient treatment. Whereas the studies of day surgery have addressed aspects such as patient satisfaction (Roberts et al., 1995; Kangas-Saarela et al., 1998; Mitchell, 1999; Lau et al., 2000) , clinical outcomes (Pineault et al., 1985) , cost efficiency (Russel et al., 1977; Pineault et al., 1985; Ancona-Berk & Chalmers, 1986; Keithley et al., 1989; Heath et al., 1990; Hollmann et al., 1994; Janeke, 1994; Clarke, 1996; Weale, 2002) , hospital efficiency (Martinussen & Midttun, 2004 ) and waiting time (Midttun & Martinussen, 2005) , little attention has been paid to patient priorities.
Using patient data from 1999-2004, the main focus of our study is on the relationship between patient severity and waiting time for day surgery. Do hospitals give priority to patients that can be treated and discharged at the same day over patients that need in-patient care over several days? Simply put, if a hospital can choose between patients that provide the same economic reimbursement, is it then more likely that low severity patients will be chosen for treatment before high severity patients? Given that length of stay can be considered a proxy on the severity of the patient's medical condition and thereby on the resource use associated with the hospital stay, the central question to be addressed is whether the waiting time for treatment within the same day-surgical diagnosis related groups (DRGs) is shorter for patients with short length of stays than for patients with long length of stays. The day-surgical DRGs are of particular interest in our setting, since the ABF system offers the same economic reimbursement for patients classified within day-surgical DRGs irrespective of whether the patient is actually treated by day surgery or in-patient care. The potential for cream-skimming should consequently be especially high within these DRGs, since the hospitals will have an incentive for prioritising patients that imply the shortest 1 See for instance Governmental White Paper no. 24 (1995-1996) .
possibly length of stay. Naturally, the waiting time for treatment is dependent upon other factors than patient severity alone, and our empirical analysis therefore controls for the age and gender of the patient, the year of treatment, and the hospital the patient received treatment in.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief introduction to the theoretical concept in question; the problem of patient selection. For a better understanding of this paper it is also helpful to outline the main characteristics of the Norwegian hospital financing system, which is also done in this section. Section 3 describes the development of day surgery in Norwegian health care and presents the most common day-surgical DRGs. Section 4 develops the empirical model for the analysis. The empirical results are reported in section 6, while section 7 contains the concluding remarks.
The problem of patient selection
Selection problems like cream-skimming is often related to competitive health insurance markets, where competing insurers receive a risk-adjusted premiumreplacing payment per insured patient. Risk-adjustment can be defined as the adjustment of premiums paid to health plans or providers based on a formula that employs individual level information as the case mix element of the DRG system and/or demographic information as is often used in capitation based systems (Barros, 2003) . The essence of the problem, as Newhouse (1998) puts it, is that a physician treating a patient will have more information about the patient's likely future spending than any risk-adjustment formula can incorporate. In such a context cream-skimming can be viewed as a form of preferred risk-selection, as the insurer select so-called preferred risks, i.e. those for whom the insurer considers risk-adjustment per capita payment to be above the expected cost level. Cream-skimming may thus occur if insurers are able to distinguish several subgroups of individuals with different expected costs within a risk group for which the risk-adjusted per capita payment is the same (de Ven & van Vliet, 1992 ).
An important point, noted by Pauly (1984) , is however that cream-skimming is the result of regulation and not of competition. If insurers are free to set their premiums in a competitive market, the result would be premium differentiation rather than cream-skimming. The problem is that premium differentiation in a free market is bound to imply that for instance an 80-year old person have to pay a much higher premium than a 20-year old, and that a chronically sick person would have to pay many times the premium of a chronically well person of the same age. According to Pauly, riskadjusted per capita payments (or vouchers) can therefore be seen as "a form of regulation that attempts to simulate the premium structure in a competitive health insurance market without having the adverse effect of (extreme) premium differentiation" (Pauly, 1984: 24) . Hence, cream-skimming is likely to occur when the system of risk-adjusted premium-replacing payments is not sufficiently sophisticated.
What then, are the adverse effects of cream-skimming? De Ven and van Vliet (1992) points out that the problems with such behaviour is three-fold. First, they note that the access to good health care for the (chronically) sick will be hindered. Insurers will try to attract the preferred risks and deter the non-preferred risks, and if the capitation system does not adequately compensate for health status, insurers will avoid providers with a good reputation of treating patients with for instance cancer, diabetes or high blood pressure, since the insurers want to avoid the patients that are attracted by these providers. Another possible outcome is higher premiums for the poorer risks, if insurers are allowed to increase their revenues by asking an additional premium from their insureds. Secondly, in the cases of insufficiently sophisticated payment systems, inefficient insurers who are successful cream-skimmers might drive efficient insurers out of the market. Investments in cream-skimming might thus have higher returns than investments in improving efficiency in the insurer's organisation or in health care provision. Thirdly, de Ven and van Vliet emphasise that while individual insurers may gain from cream-skimming, they only shift the costs to others. There is therefore no social gain associated with cream-skimming. On the contrary, the costs of creamskimming imply that there are only social welfare losses. In sum, cream-skimming can thus be considered counterproductive with respect to three supposedly positive effects of competition; i.e. improving the quality and efficiency of care and becoming more responsive to consumers' preferences (de Ven & van Vliet, 1992) .
At hospital level similar mechanisms prevail. The reimbursement incentives in a hospital financing system will influence the intensity of services and who is treated when patients differ in severity of illness (Ellis, 1998 Newhouse (1989) and Frank and Lave (1989) .
The Norwegian reimbursement system prior to 1997 -implying that every hospital received a global budget by the beginning of the year -can be characterised as a prospective payment system, and thus provided incentives for cream-skimming.
However, the reimbursement system was combined with strong prioritising signals, both from central government and from county politicians, which were compatible with basic medical ethics: patient severity should be the main prioritising rule. It is generally believed that this rule was followed. Yet, as a result of relatively low growth in the budgets in this period the system also produced long waiting lists and waiting time for elective treatment. The introduction of ABF increased production and efficiency (e.g. Biørn et al., 2003) and reduced waiting lists and waiting time. But did it also lead to cream-skimming? Initially, 30-50 per cent of the grant was given in accordance to the activity performance and patient mix. The ABF share was then gradually increased to 60 per cent of the total budget in 2003. Basic economics would not predict any changes in rules of prioritising by going from one to another prospective payment system. Still, the question is whether the introduction of a way of economic thinking in one area (that revenues increase with increased production)
will infuse the thinking in other area (that net revenues will increase as less severe patients are treated). Understood in this manner, hospital preferences are endogenised.
Revenues will thus enter the hospitals' utility function as the reimbursement system changes.
The implementation of the ABF system in Norway implied that a proportion of the block grant from central government was replaced by a matching grant depending upon the number and composition of hospital treatments. This partial replacement of the block grant necessitated that the hospital activities were made more visible than before to secure patient reimbursements. Reflecting these new challenges for the hospitals, a survey conducted in 1999 on the consequences of the ABF system showed that 10 per cent of the chief surgeons in somatic hospitals had experienced pressure or instructions from the hospital management to give preference to profitable patients (Halvorsen, 1999) . Also, in 10 per cent of the polyclinics the respondents held the opinion that the choice as to whether patient treatment was to take place via hospitalisation, day treatment or in polyclinics was guided by revenue generation rather than medical evaluations. Moreover, 25 per cent of the chief surgeons considered operations and treatment to be de-prioritised due to dependency of polyclinic income.
Similarly, the change of ownership and organisational form from governmental bodies to trusts in 2002 may also change the rules of prioritisations, as trusts are believed to be more revenue-oriented than governmental bodies. Consequently, even if central government has emphasised that prioritisations should be grounded in medical ethics rather than on the basis of economic evaluations, there has been a growing concern -indicated for instance in several articles in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical Association -that the latter may still become the case in the wake of the trust reform. As Haug (2001) notes, given that the reform shifts power from politicians, patients and health professions to enterprises and economists in the new hospital trusts, it is all the more important how these actors think and prioritise.
Similarly, Øgar (2001) points out that the new trusts are strongly orientated towards principles of business management, with income and the fulfilment of economic responsibilities strongly related to the production of profitable services. Øgar therefore find it difficult to see how the less profitable -but health-politically prioritised -services and activities are to be attended within the new system.
Ultimately, he notes, if the principles of business management are to guide hospital activities and services, we may risk that the healthiest patients will be given even higher priority at the expense of the least healthy patients.
As already noted, the day-surgical activity of the hospitals is a useful starting point for an investigation of the extent of patient selection in Norway. Given that the hospitals receive no additional refunds for day surgery patients that need to be hospitalised for treatment, a situation exists where it is possible to distinguish between subgroups of patients with different expected costs for which the hospital financing system does not fully compensate. Hence, a hospital that is successful in selecting day surgery patients that can be treated and discharged at the same day thus face lower costs than a hospital that have a large share of day surgery patients that need inpatient care. In the next section we present the day-surgical activity in Norway in closer detail.
Day surgery in Norwegian healthcare
In order to study day surgery empirically, two important aspects need to be clarified.
We need to consider first whether day surgery should be assumed to be elective (i.e. planned), and, secondly, whether inpatient admissions with 0 days length of stay should be defined as day surgery. Building on the common approach of several other
Norwegian studies (Huseby, 2002; 2004; Martinussen, 2005; Martinussen & Midttun, 2004; Midttun & Martinussen, 2005) , day surgery is in the following defined rather widely, including all surgical treatment with 0 days length of stay, independent of whether the patient is admitted to an inpatient ward or day treatment ward, and independent of whether the operation is planned or not. Given such a definition, day surgery now constitutes almost 50 per cent of all surgery in Norway, and 61 per cent of all elective surgery. Day surgery was not included in the ABF system until 1999, and is therefore not registered for earlier years, but during the 6-year-period for which data exists the number of day-surgical procedures has increased by nearly 52 per cent and more than 65.000 stays.
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A first impression of the relationship between patient severity and waiting time for elective day surgery can be obtained by comparing the waiting time for short stays (length of stay = 0 days) and long stays (length of stay 1 day). This is done in figure 2 , and the figure obviously lends little support to a hypothesis that more severe patients waited longer than less severe patients. give preference to patients that can actually undergo day-surgical treatment, or to patients that at least have as short length of stay as possible, since the hospitals are only refunded for same-day treatments. However, the prospect for making this kind of patient selection is naturally higher the larger and more heterogeneous the patient group. Hence, for the DRGs with near 100 per cent day surgery, there exits little room for prioritising between patients based on assumed length of stay, since almost all patients are treated and discharged the same day. As it is difficult to decide exactly where to set the limit for which DRGs should be investigated, and in order to obtain as a complete picture as possible, we therefore choose to include too many DRGs rather than too few. 
Empirical model
In this section we elaborate a simple empirical model to test the hypothesis that presumably high severity patients have longer waiting times than presumably low severity patients. Although patient severity is the variable of main interest in our study, a number of additional factors can naturally be expected to influence the time a patient has to wait before admission to hospital, and consequently need to be controlled for in the analysis. Our model captures both patient-specific and hospitalspecific aspects, as well as the dynamic dimension (for a more detailed description of the variables in the analysis, see the appendix).
Starting with the central explanatory variable, patient severity is operationalised as the patient's length of stay. The underlying assumption is that hospitals in most cases hold relatively detailed information about a patient's condition, obtained either through medical deliberations from the patient's primary physician, through polyclinical consultations at the hospital, or both. When organising the waiting list, the hospital will therefore have a pretty good estimate on most patients' length of stays, and thereby on the costs and resources that can be expected to be related to each case.
The hospitals then have an incentive to select the patients that can be assumed to have the shortest length of stay, thereby reducing the costs. Hence, our main hypothesis is that length of stay is positively related to waiting time; that is, that the most complicated patients had to wait the longest for treatment.
Another important patient-specific determinant of waiting time is assumed to be the age of the patient. The expectation is that long waiting times for elderly patients generally can be associated with increased risks for complications and further health deteriorating effects. Moreover, elderly patients often have multiple diagnoses, which constitute an additional reason for prioritising elderly patients in lieu of younger ones.
Also, former waiting list regulations explicitly pinpointed that when all other conditions were equal, elderly patients should be prioritised (Jørgensen & Kalseth, 1993) . In a study of 452 patients referred to in-patient surgery at Akershus Central Hospital, Arnesen et al. (2002) thus found that patients above 70 years of age had the shortest waiting times. We therefore expect age to have a negative impact on waiting time.
A third patient characteristic incorporated in the model is the gender of the patient.
Even if there is a fundamental Norwegian health political objective that everyone should have equal accessibility to health services (NOU, 1999a), we shall control whether gender bias leads to discrepancies in the waiting time for treatment. It is commonly assumed that women in general have longer waits than men, and that this can be explained firstly by differences in the extensiveness of various diagnoses, and secondly by an unequal prioritisation of these diagnoses in the disfavour of women. If that is the case, illnesses and diagnoses most typical for men will often be prioritised on the expense of 'women's diseases'. This anticipation has found support in a Norwegian study documenting that illnesses and medical specialities most typical for women have historically been validated lower with regard to prestige among medically trained personnel (Album, 1991) . Furthermore, such an expectation is in accordance with the statements in a Norwegian white paper from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (NOU, 1999b), emphasising that medical research traditionally has been guided by a 'male norm'. More importantly, several international studies have reported gender-specific waiting time variations within certain DRGs, with men systematically favoured (e.g Dong et al, 1998; Langham et al, 1997; Alter et al, 1999; Naylor & Levinton, 1993; Steingart et al, 1991; Petticrew et al, 1993; Kee et al, 1993) . Consequently, a dummy variable with men as reference category is included in the analysis.
Waiting time is also assumed to be strongly related to whether the patient was treated in a private hospital or not. Given that the private hospitals operate under the principles of profit maximisation, and that their role is to handle the less complicated procedures for the public hospitals, the waiting time for treatment is consequently much shorter than in public hospitals.
Furthermore, to control for the strong variations in waiting time at the institutional level, the model also include hospital-specific dummy-variables. The Norwegian health care system consists of various types of hospitals, and it is usually separated between university clinics, central hospitals, county hospitals with central hospital wards, local hospitals, and county hospitals with reduced local hospital services (Huseby, 2002b) . The range of specialities differs much between the hospitals, and the waiting time consequently varies. Although the most specialised hospitals in general have access to more resources than the other hospitals, they also have a more complex patient mix. This naturally occupies personnel and resources, which could otherwise have been used to treat a large number of patients, and thereby cutting back waiting lists. On the other hand, the largest hospitals will benefit from scale effects, and thereby have the most efficient activity and shorter waiting time for treatment.
A factor that complicates our analysis is the expansion of separate day surgical units during the period analysed. Obviously, an increase in day surgical units may stimulate treatments of less severe cases. Although investments in day surgical units can be understood as a mean to increase revenues -and could thereby well be stimulated by both the ABF and the trust reform -technological change should be seen as the main explanation of the growth of day surgical units. This complicating factor in the statistical analysis is partly handled by including the hospital-specific variables: by controlling for the hospital that the patient was treated in, we indirectly also manage to account for the variation in day surgery between hospitals.
Finally, to account for the time-wise variation during the six-year period analysed, year-specific dummy-variables also enter the model. 
Empirical results
Three sets of variables are included in our model. The first group represents the patient-specific characteristics: length of stay, the age and gender of the patient, and whether the patient was treated at a private hospital or not. The second group of variables adds a set of hospital-specific dummy-variables to the model, while the last set of variables account for the dynamic aspect by including year-specific dummyvariables. The analysis employs patient-data for the period from 1999 to 2004, and includes only day-surgical DRGs that a) represent a patient volume of at least 1 per cent of all day-surgical stays during the period, and b) day-surgical DRGs with less than 90 per cent same-day treatment share. By these criteria we are left with 24 DRGs available for analysis, including between 11 040 and 49 223 patients. The model is estimated via OLS regression, and the results are reported in table 2. All models were estimated with hospital-specific dummy-variables, but these estimates are not shown in the table.
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Conclusion
Our ambition with this paper was to investigate empirically the patient priorities within the main day-surgical DRGs in Norway. Employing the problem of patient selection as our theoretical departure, the empirical analysis set out to test whether waiting time for treatment is related to severity of illness. Our main argument is that the day-surgical DRGs deserves special attention in such a context, since hospitals in the ABF system are refunded the same for patients classified within day-surgical DRGs independently of whether they were actually treated by day surgery or inpatient care. The fact that the share of same-day treatment is relatively low in several daysurgical DRGs therefore commands the following question: do hospitals give priority to the patients that imply the shortest length of stay, since each day of in-patient care
represent an additional cost that will not be reimbursed? Our empirical results certainly indicate that some form of patient selection occurs within several of the largest DRGs, mainly within the light orthopaedic procedures. This holds even when controlling for other important determinants of waiting time, such as the age and gender of the patient and being treated at a private hospital, as well as institutional and dynamic variation.
Yet, our results should be interpreted with some caution. First of all, the fact that the overall waiting time for day surgery has decreased not only for short stays, but also for long stays, implies that the observed waiting list adjustments not necessarily need to be in conflict with the basic principles of patient prioritisations. Secondly, whereas the present paper focuses solely on economic motivation as an explanation for patient selection, this is probably only part of the picture. Needless to say, the practical organisation of the day-surgical activity is far too complex to be modelled satisfactorily with the data at hand, and our analysis therefore probably fails to capture several important aspects that can influence a patient's waiting time for treatment. In general, it can be assumed that the more complicated a patient is, the more hospital resources are necessary in terms of personnel and equipment in order to perform the operation. This will especially be the case for patients with multiple diagnoses. It is consequently more challenging to organise and schedule treatment for such patients, which may in many cases lead to longer waiting time. The essential point however, is that this kind of waiting list adjustments would relate to capacity problems and organisational challenges rather than to economic motivations.
The increasing use of so-called ring fencing of elective surgery in Norwegian hospitals during the period of analysis may serve as a practical illustration of this aspect. Ring fencing refers to the practice where a whole department or unit is secluded from the other activity taking place within the hospital (see e.g. Kjekshus & Hagen, 2004) . So far, this organising principle has been most commonly applied for elective surgery, the main argument being that it may increase a hospital's efficiency through a reduced number of cancellations due to emergency admissions. In 1999, 17
per cent of Norwegian somatic hospitals had separate ring fenced departments, while this share increased by four percentage points to 21 per cent over the next two years.
The activity in ring fenced units is organised according to the assembly line principle:
"the patient arrives promptly at the top of the corridor and goes through the preoperation room, operation, recovery, and then leaves at the end of the corridor with a pre-completed medical report in hand" (Hagen & Kjekshus, 2004: 58) . The surgery is often highly specialised, with for instance only left-knee operations performed one particular day, and the next day only right-hip operations. As noted by Kjekshus and
Hagen, the surgical team will thus be able to streamline production, with the operation theatre equipped only for those procedures to be handled on that specific day. The introduction of ring fencing in Norwegian healthcare must be seen in relation to the parallel increase in the use of day surgery during the same period, since the activity in ring fencing units most commonly will be day-surgical procedures. Empirical evidence from Norway suggests that the use of ring fencing may increase hospital efficiency (Kjekshus & Hagen, 2004) and that it reduces hospital waiting time (Midttun & Martinussen, 2005) . The introduction of ring fencing could therefore serve as an additional explanation to the results presented here, since patients eligible for procedures performed in ring fenced units can expect to wait shorter than patients that are treated in ordinary units. But again, this kind of patient selection must be seen as a result of organisational matters rather than as an attempt to cream-skim patients to reduce hospital costs.
Given the intricate workings of the day-surgical activity, it is therefore evident that the data available today can only bring us part of the way to understand how patients are selected for treatment. A combination of more qualitative approaches and better data that would allow for the development of more sophisticated models incorporating important factors related to capacity, organisation, use of personnel and equipment, can help us grasp the full picture. But irrespective of whether it is the internal hospital organisation or the theory of cream-skimming that shed the most light on the problem of patient selection, the fact still remains: the most complicated patients had to wait the longest for a number of day-surgical treatments. And it is probably safe to assume that for these patients it mattered little which factors actually could explain their extra waiting time. Per cent day surgery 
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